A defence sale ends when the invoice is paid.
A defence relationship begins after that.
This feature will increasingly define India’s ambitions as a defence exporter.
The numbers have already changed dramatically. India’s defence exports reached a record ₹38,424 crore in FY2025–26, up 62.66 per cent over the previous year. The private sector contributed ₹17,353 crore, or 45.16 per cent of total exports. Indian defence products are now being exported to more than 80 countries.
This is no longer a peripheral activity.
It is becoming an instrument of industrial policy, diplomacy and strategic engagement.
But a difficult question follows.
Can India turn defence exports into enduring defence partnerships?
That is a different proposition altogether.
Tarang Shakti offers a useful window
The second edition of Exercise Tarang Shakti is underway at Jodhpur from September 26 to October 12.
Eight foreign air forces are participating with air assets, while 32 countries are attending as observers. The exercise includes the United States, France, Germany, Australia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the UAE alongside India. American F-35s, French Rafales and UAE F-16s are among the aircraft participating.
Besides symbolism, the more important lesson is operational.
An exercise such as Tarang Shakti allows foreign air forces to see how India trains, plans, sustains and operates. It exposes partner nations to Indian platforms, support systems, logistics practices and professional military culture.
That creates something a brochure cannot.
Confidence.
And confidence is the foundation of defence exports.
A weapon is only the beginning
Imagine an Indian system being sold to a friendly country.
What happens when the system needs maintenance?
Who provides the spares?
Who trains the technicians?
Who upgrades the software?
What happens five years later when the customer’s operational requirement changes?
Can India provide the answer?
If not, the initial sale may remain just that — a sale.
The more ambitious model is different.
India should increasingly think in terms of defence ecosystems.
Training.
Maintenance.
Logistics.
Upgrades.
Simulation.
Spare parts.
Technical assistance.
Joint production.
And eventually, where appropriate, joint development.
That should become a central principle of India’s defence-export strategy.
Trust cannot be manufactured overnight
Defence customers are not buying an automobile.
They are making a long-term security decision.
A fighter aircraft, missile system, radar or artillery platform becomes part of a country’s national security architecture. Once inducted, the customer becomes dependent on the supplier for several years.
That creates a responsibility for the exporter.
India therefore needs to build a reputation for reliability, responsiveness and predictability.
The question should not be merely, “How much can we export?”
It should be, “How well can we support what we export?”
That is where India’s growing manufacturing capability must connect with diplomacy.
The Ministry of Defence reports that domestic defence production reached ₹1.78 lakh crore in FY2025–26. The private sector’s contribution rose to around ₹42,000 crore.
This growing industrial base provides the foundation.
But the next step requires institutional depth.
Defence diplomacy is becoming industrial diplomacy
Military exercises are no longer only about flying sorties or conducting tactical drills.
They are also relationship-building platforms.
Tarang Shakti demonstrates the point.
When multiple air forces operate together, they exchange more than tactics. They experience each other’s procedures, communication systems, maintenance practices and professional standards.
That creates networks.
Those networks can eventually support industrial cooperation.
The same logic applies to India’s maritime and land partnerships.
Training creates familiarity.
Familiarity creates confidence.
Confidence creates institutional relationships.
And institutional relationships can create industrial opportunities.
This is where defence exports and foreign policy increasingly intersect.
What must Indian industry learn?
The first lesson is that after-sales service is not a support function. It is part of the product.
The second is that customisation matters.
Different countries operate in different climates, terrains and threat environments. Export variants must reflect the customer’s actual operational requirements.
DRDO already provides support for export variants of technologies and allows industry access to relevant testing facilities.
The third lesson is financing.
A technically strong product can still lose a competition if the commercial package is weak.
Financing, training, maintenance and lifecycle costs increasingly matter alongside acquisition price.
And finally, India must develop a culture of long-term customer engagement.
A defence export should ideally create the next opportunity.
Not through aggressive salesmanship.
Through performance.
From “Made in India” to “Trusted by others”
This is perhaps the more meaningful evolution of Aatmanirbharta.
The first phase was about building in India.
The next phase is about building systems that others are willing to depend upon.
That is a much harder test.
It requires quality control. Consistency. Cyber resilience. Spare-part availability. Technical documentation. Skilled manpower. Financial discipline. And political credibility.
In military service, one learns quickly that a system is only as good as the support behind it.
The same applies to defence exports.
India has made the difficult transition from being predominantly a defence importer to becoming a growing defence producer and exporter. The next transition will be from exporter to long-term strategic partner.
That will not be achieved by the number printed on an export dashboard alone.
It will be achieved when a foreign military says, in effect:
We trust the equipment.
We trust the people behind it.
And we trust that India will remain there when we need support.
That is the real test of India’s defence-export ambition.
(Part 2- concluded)
