Well, nobody can be ready for two front war if it’s an all out war, but there are always plans to tackle two fronts by maximising the potential and the inventory. But generally, the idea is always to have readiness for one full-fledged adversary or one full-fledged war with one adversary and maybe half a front with the other. Because there are multiple factors which prevents the two-front war in that sense.
India can always give a bloody nose to China, if not an outright victory. So, everybody will be careful. This two-front war not limited to geography, because China and Pakistan anyway are in an axis. So, what we saw in Sindoor was actually a three-front war with China, Pakistan and Turkey fighting together. And we still managed to beat the hell out of Pakistan.
Whether China will back Pakistan completely is a question because during both 1965 and 1971 war or even Kargil, all that China did was to threaten India, but never moved militarily against India. But does China want India to be defeated or Pakistan to get an upper hand against India?
And therefore, in a conceivable timeframe, I don’t see a two front physical war on two fronts happening.
Are theatre commands being built specifically to address these different fronts being opened and preparedness?
They are. Actually, if you see the three proposed theatre commands are actually meant, they are adversary specific. They are not geographical entities.
Read Also: Sovereignty First: Why India’s Defence Budget Signals a Strategic Shift in a Dangerous World
For instance, the Northern Theatre Command is going to stretch from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, the entire northern border. So that is China specific. Then the Western Front, Western Theatre Command is meant for Pakistan. And the Maritime Theatre Command is for the maritime domain. So that’s how they have now decided to fight the future wars and which is very appropriate and timely.
After Uri and Operation Sindoor, do you think India’s military doctrine has visibly changed from deterrence to proactive response?
Oh, it has. It has. It is what I call dynamic response strategy, that you do the response according to the situation. If Uri was a surgical strike across the land border, Balakot was a breakthrough after 1971 to raid Pakistan mainland or heart of Pakistan, not POJK, but the mainland Pakistan via an air raid using fighter jets. Then Sindoor took it three, four steps further, where you went and hit the nerve centre of Pakistani army inside Punjab province, from where they recruit majority of their forces.
So that is why I call it the dynamic response strategy and not just proactive – depending on the situation, the context and the timing.
India is pushing very hard for defence indigenisation. Are we becoming self-reliant or are we still heavily dependent on foreign systems in critical areas?
No, we are still dependent though not heavily dependent. A lot has changed since 2016. But indigenisation and self-reliance is not easy because of several reasons, like technology denial for years and the iron grip that most of these big military industrial complexes have on supply chains. There was no policy backing for indigenisation earlier. Now that it’s been 10-11 years of the indigenisation policy, many things have changed. So, I would put it, we are about 50-60% there.
Are we currently pushing for at least design, if not the entire technology, whenever we are going for purchases and for weaponry and ammunition?
Yes. In fact, in 2016, a very major policy change happened where a category of procurement called Buy-IDDM, (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured) Equipment was introduced. And that has given a lot of impetus for owning IP and getting Indian companies to design their own products, which also gives you the ability to upgrade when required or as and when the technology develops.
Everybody is gushing about S-400 air defence system after Sindoor. So can you please cite a couple of homegrown cutting-edge technologies where India has an unbeatable edge vis-a-vis Pakistan, if not China?
Yeah. So S-400 is the apex of air defence, layered air defence India has utilised during Operation Sindoor. But Akash air defence system, too is a big success. So you have concentric circles. If you look at S-400 as the outermost circle, 400-kilometre range. Then you come into the inner circle. Every layer, there is a small success story of Indian equipment and Indian innovation. So, the last of the inner circle, which is just about 100 metres or maybe 50 metres, is an old analogous L-70 air defence gun, which has been upgraded by a latest software. And it was used during Operation Sindoor.
Then there is BrahMos, a cruise missile. Although a joint venture, it has now become about 60-70% indigenised. It was the game changer in Sindoor. And then you have other missiles like Akash Teer, which puts all the air defence systems on one platform to operate seamlessly. Then there is some loitering munition, some drones, counter drones. Indian solutions for Indian wars.
Both Ukraine or Iran wars are being fought with drones and missiles.Are we capable of making similar cheap drones and cheap missiles?
Oh, yes. Thousands of them are being made now. In fact, there is already a programme which I personally saw in some of the frontline units where they are using 3D printing technology for making smaller drones, cheap drones in thousands, in hundreds and thousands. Having the small payloads, doing swarms. Today, the hottest item for procurement in the Indian system is drone and counter drones. And of course, missiles and rockets.
Pinaka is a big success. It’s a weapon for 60-70 km range, which is very good for Pakistan, at least, if not for China. And they’re trying to extend the Pinaka range to 120 kms. Rockets are also being manufactured, assembled and manufactured in India. Grenades have got upgraded.
Indian Air Force is operating with roughly 30 squadrons against sanctioned strength of 42.Can India realistically claim credible air superiority?
Not really. But see, 42 was a figure which was promulgated in the early 2000s, which included and which assumed that it will be third generation. Now, I’ll just give an analogy that two squadrons of Rafale would be equivalent to at least six squadrons of MiGs. Plus, today the old dogfight in the air is no longer viable for any Air Force. It is all about beyond visual range.
You need the fighter jets as platforms to carry heavy missiles. They can still stay back in our own territory and then fire from there. Because the missile ranges, long range vectors, ranges have increased to, you know, 300, 400 kilometres, like Scalp and Meteor etc which we got from France. There is also the air-launched BrahMos missile, which actually created havoc in Pakistan. So it is not necessary to have 40 squadrons. One could do with immediate induction of at least five more squadrons of Rafale to begin with and then, you know, taking it forward.
Air Force has suffered from the underperformance or non-performance of HAL and its inability to deliver LCA, which was supposed to replace at least 10 squadrons of the MiGs, which were phased out one by one.
You have been covering defence for more than 40 years. What is one defence issue you feel the Indian media has been consistently misunderstanding?
I think we get too perturbed by Indian media, to my mind, is either kept busy or remains busy with the cacophony of trivia rather than, you know, larger issues and it doesn’t see it in the context. There are two extremes in the Indian media, one which says that India needs to strengthen itself no matter where you get the technology from. And then there are import Bahadurs.
Then there is the other extreme which says, no, only LCA and all the homegrown technology must be taken and nothing else should come from outside. Now, that’s a, it’s a Hitlerian kind of mindset on both sides. In today’s world, you cannot live with your own, I mean, you cannot have everything on your own. Neither should you import everything from outside. A good mix, a good balance. And there are constraints.
About The Author:
Nitin Anant Gokhale is s Defence Analyst a thought leader, and an author of over half a dozen books on defence and strategic affairs. He heads publications like StratNewsGlobal and BharatShakti.
Read Also: The Source Code Playbook: Rewriting India’s Defence Strategy for Tomorrow’s War
